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 • The 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which sealed Hungary’s loss of a third of 
its territory, is perceived as the country’s greatest national tragedy. 
The breakup of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary, as a result 
of which large Hungarian-speaking populations found themselves in 
neighbouring countries, was a pivotal event which influenced Hun-
gary’s national identity as well as its internal and foreign policies 
for the next one hundred years. Hungary responded to the Treaty 
of Trianon by developing various concepts to reclaim the lost terri-
tories, but also with efforts to build good relations with neighbours 
and develop policies towards the Hungarian minorities in other 
countries.
 • Revisionist concepts to reclaim the lost lands play a marginal role in 
today’s politics in Hungary. Such ideas, which dominated in the inter-
war period, largely lost any credibility during World War II, when 
Hungary temporarily regained some of its former territories – at the 
expense of striking an alliance with Nazi Germany. In the Commu-
nist era, the question of borders and of commemorating the Treaty 
of Trianon became taboo. In democratic Hungary, all mainstream 
political parties have rejected revisionism, the country signed trea-
ties on good relations with its neighbours in which it waived all ter-
ritorial claims, and the neighbour countries committed to respecting 
the rights of the Hungarian minorities.
 • Nevertheless, revisionist ideas and the sense of historical injustice 
have been exploited by far-right organisations and political parties. 
Since 2006, in parallel with the deepening political and economic cri-
sis, a revival of the revisionist concepts dating back to the interwar 
era has been underway. Rejected by the political mainstream, they 
have become part of the political ideology of Hungary’s growing 














 • In power since 2010, the Fidesz party has tried to address the emo-
tions that the Treaty of Trianon still evokes among part of the Hun-
garian public, and by doing so, win back some of those voters from 
the extreme right. The Treaty of Trianon began to be commemo-
rated at the state level. On 4 June 2010, on the 90th anniversary of the 
treaty, Viktor Orbán’s government made that date a day of national 
remembrance, and ten years later commemorated the treaty’s cente-
nary by erecting a monument in front of the parliament building in 
Budapest – the first such memorial to be funded by the government 
since World War II. Hungary’s official documents, and especially 
the 2012 Constitution, emphasise the unity of the Hungarian  people 
across state borders. Under Fidesz, Hungarians living in neighbour-
ing countries have been offered easier procedures for obtaining 
Hungarian citizenship (around one million people have taken this 
opportunity) and have been granted limited voting rights.
 • Nevertheless, the 1920 treaty has not become a central element in 
the historical policy of Viktor Orbán’s government, which prefers 
to invoke the tradition of the Hungarian uprisings and the anti-
-communist struggles. The Treaty of Trianon is a symbol of a national 
disaster, and as such is seen by people in Fidesz as a problematic 
foundation upon which to build a national identity. Hence, this year’s 
centenary celebrations emphasised not so much the grievance and 
injustice of it, as the fact that Hungarians persevered for a century 
despite the ‘tragedy of Trianon’. Fidesz’s decade in power was repre-
sented as a period of the state’s spiritual revival. However, political 
messages with revisionist undertones have nonetheless been com-
municated to the more radically inclined voters.
 • Attitudes towards the Treaty of Trianon have been influenced by 
the political and economic position in which Hungary finds itself 
today. The country is interconnected with its neighbours by a dense 
network of military, political and economic links, based on its mem-













including the Visegrad Group in particular. Romania and Slovakia, 
which host the largest Hungarian minorities, are two of Hungary’s 
top trading partners. Central European regional co-operation holds 
a special position in the current foreign policy doctrines of the Hun-
garian government and is an important element in prime minister 
Orbán’s ideological messaging.
 • All of this does not mean that the Trianon question has no potential 
to trigger conflicts today. Hungary’s neighbours have been concerned 
about the Hungarian leaders’ historical references to the interwar 
regime or the growing acceptance for revisionist symbols in the pub-
lic sphere, which has been evident during the Fidesz government’s 
decade long tenure in power. This refers in particular to Romania 
and Slovakia, which are sensitive to any mention of revisionist 
ideas, as well as Ukraine, which has been battling against Russian 
aggression. This may negatively affect the situation of the Hungarian 














The 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon, which in principle defined Hunga-
ry’s contemporary borders, was a pivotal point in the nation’s history. 
It sealed the disintegration of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary, 
which had been part of the Austria-Hungary Dual Monarchy. The peace 
treaty not only deprived Hungary of two thirds of its territory and left 
large Hungarian populations abroad (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix), 
but also reduced Hungary, until then a constituent of one of Europe’s 
main powers, to the status of a small, land-locked country. At the same 
time, however, Hungary became an independent state for the first time 
since the 16th century. It now faced the challenge of defining its position 
among Europe’s new political and economic realities.
Over the last century, Hungary has approached the legacy of the Treaty 
of Trianon in various ways: from trying to reclaim the lost lands in an alli-
ance with revisionist powers, through completely silencing the treaty’s 
legacy in public debate, to building relations with neighbour countries 
and developing a  policy model to support the Hungarian minorities 
 living there.
The state’s breakup has left a  lasting mark on the national identity of 
the Hungarians. It has engendered a collective feeling of grievance and 
injustice, a pessimistic view of international relations and a distrust 
of neighbouring countries and the policies of the great powers. While 
the Hungarian national identity has also been shaped by various other 
developments and historical processes in the decades that followed the 
treaty, the memory of the lost territories, of which the Treaty of Trianon 














I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE REVISIONIST IDEA
The concepts to seek a revision of the borders set in Trianon date back 
to the period immediately after the Peace Treaty was signed in  1920. 
This is when the revisionist demands and slogans, the residues of which 
are still present in public debate today, were first formulated. When the 
Habsburg empire collapsed towards the end of World War I, Hungary 
became an independent state. At the same time, its national minorities, 
which accounted for nearly half of the population of the Kingdom of 
Hungary according to the 1910 census, preferred to join the existing or 
newly established neighbour states in view of Austria-Hungary’s defeat 
in the war. The neighbour countries took large swathes of the original 
Hungarian state – a move that was sealed by the victorious powers in 
the Treaty of Trianon (see Appendix: The causes of the disintegration of 
the Kingdom of Hungary). After 1920, Hungary became a much more eth-
nically homogenous state, but nearly a  third of the ethnic Hungarian 
population (around 3.2 million people) found themselves outside Hun-
gary. The  country was also deprived of important natural resources, 
a number of important cities and industrial centres, and large markets. 
A number of localities important for the Hungarian national identity 
also found themselves outside Hungary, including Transylvania in par-
ticular, which was incorporated into Romania. Finally, Hungary became 
a state without allies, and its three neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Yugosla-
via and Romania, created a military alliance in the event Hungary tried 
to militarily change its new borders.
Reclaiming the lands that belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary was the 
principal objective of Hungary’s foreign policy in the years 1920–1944. 
The country’s leaders outlined various scenarios to that end, most of 
which envisaged taking back the territories where ethnic Hungarians 
were the majority. The official government agenda, however, was one of 
integral revisionism, i.e. the ambition of restoring the Kingdom of Hun-
gary to its pre-war borders. Revisionism became the ideological founda-













diverse groups in the power elite of the day and the pledge to restore 
Hungary’s ‘greatness’ was the foundation on which the ruling camp built 
its legitimacy. The revisionist idea was part of the state propaganda of 
the period and was ubiquitous in the public space (where it expressed 
itself through monuments, among other ways) and in popular culture.1
While some called for military action, Hungarian revisionism mainly 
sought to reclaim the lost territories through peaceful means. In  the 
interwar period, Hungary was weaker economically and militarily than 
the neighbours against which it had territorial claims. For this reason, 
the Hungarian leadership focused on seeking support for the idea of 
a revision of the Treaty of Trianon among revisionist powers, i.e. first 
Mussolini’s Italy and then Hitler’s Germany. With the support of the lat-
ter, in the years 1938–1941 Hungary temporarily regained around half 
of the territory lost after World War I.2 However, this came at the cost 
of deepening subordination of Hungary to the Third Reich, followed 
by subsequent defeat in the war, after which Hungary lost the territo-
ries once again. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty restored the borders set in 
 Trianon and Hungary additionally lost three municipalities in the Brati-
slava area to Czechoslovakia.
The World War I defeat marked the end of revisionism as a state ide-
ology. The fiasco of the Horthy era revisionist project largely defined 
Hungary’s attitude to the legacies of the Treaty of Trianon in the decades 
that followed. It demonstrated the risks and costs of attempts at chang-
ing borders. The  alliance with Nazi Germany became a  long -lasting 
encumbrance to Hungary’s international reputation. Hungary’s Second 
Army, fighting on the Eastern Front in World War II side by side with the 
Wehrmacht, suffered massive losses (around half of the 250,000 soldiers 
1 M. Zeidler, Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920–1945, New York 2007.
2 In 1938 Hungary regained a strip of land in southern Slovakia under the First Vienna 
Award, in 1939 it occupied Czechoslovakia’s Carpathian Ruthenia, in 1940 reclaimed 
the norther part of Transylvania from Romania under the Second Vienna Award, 













were killed or wounded). In 1944 several hundred thousand Hungarian 
Jews were deported and murdered in the German death camps. Towards 
the end of the war Hungary became the scene of ferocious fighting 
between German and Soviet forces (the siege of Budapest was one of 
the longest in the war), and the Soviet troops were all the more brutal 
towards the civilians as they perceived the Hungarians as close allies 
of the Reich. Finally, the re-incorporation of the contentious territories 
into Hungary’s neighbours was often followed by repression against the 
ethnic Hungarians living there.
A number of critical studies of the revisionist ideology were written in 
the post -war period, but this reckoning was interrupted when the Com-
munists took over full power in 1949.3 Under Communist rule, the Hor-
thy era was unequivocally condemned, revisionist demands were banned, 
and discussion about the Treaty of Trianon was censored. It was only 
during the thaw in the 1970s and 1980s that Hungarian historians were 
able to address the topic relatively freely.
The question of Hungarian national minorities in the neighbouring coun-
tries also remained a taboo subject for the Communist government for 
a long time. The peace treaties signed after World War II did not envisage 
protections for ethnic minorities and it was common practice to simply 
resettle minority populations.4 In the case of Hungarian minorities, this 
is what happened to several thousand people resettled to Hungary from 
Czechoslovakia under the so-called Beneš decrees. However, the ethnic 
Hungarians mostly remained in the territories detached from Hungary. 
In keeping with the doctrine imposed by the Soviet Union on its satellite 
states, the Communist authorities of Hungary did not raise the question 
of the Hungarian minority and its rights in bilateral relations with its 
3 The Miseries of East European Small States, a 1946 essay by the distinguished Hungar-
ian political thinker István Bibó, was one of the most important works about the 
ethnic and border conflicts (published in English in The Art of Peacemaking: Political 
Essays by István Bibó, University Press Scholarship Online, May 2015).
4 J. Jackson Preece, ‘Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki’, Review 













neighbours, treating it as their internal affair. Contacts with Hungarians 
living in the neighbouring countries were difficult, despite the officially 
friendly relations with those states. However, support for the Hungarian 
minorities became one of the main topics around which the democratic 
opposition started to organise itself in the late period of Communist 
rule. Invoking the principle of respect for human rights, as stipulated 
in the 1975 final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, it protested against repression against the Hungarian minority 













II. THE QUESTION OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON 
AFTER 1989
The foundations for Hungary’s contemporary approach towards the ter-
ritories lost under the Treaty of Trianon and their Hungarian popula-
tions were laid during the 1989–1990 political transformation. The first 
democratically elected conservative government of József Antall set 
three overarching objectives for Hungary’s foreign policy: integration 
with Western structures, development of good relations with its neigh-
bour states and support for the Hungarian minorities living in those 
states. The principle of inviolability of borders was reasserted, but at the 
same time Hungarians living abroad were recognised as members of 
the national community.5 A provision was included in the constitution, 
stipulating that the Hungarian state bore responsibility for the fate of 
Hungarians in other countries, and a number of support mechanisms 
for those communities were introduced.
However, the concept of completely giving up territorial claims remained 
controversial in Hungary, as the negotiations of the treaties on good 
neighbourly relations demonstrated. Problems first emerged during 
the parliamentary ratification of the treaty with Ukraine in 1991, but it 
was the treaties with Slovakia and Romania, i.e. the countries hosting 
the largest Hungarian minorities, which caused the most controversy. 
The two countries expected Hungary to recognise their territorial integ-
rity, while Hungary demanded commitments to provide protections to 
the Hungarian minorities, ideally by recognising their collective rights 
and offering them autonomy. The negotiations lasted until the mid-1990s 
and were concluded only in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Concessions had 
been made by Hungary, which definitively waived any territorial claims 
against Slovakia and Romania (the formula which said ‘also in the future’ 
5 In 1990 Antall made his emblematic statement in which he said he was “the prime 
minister of a ten -million Hungary, but in spirit he wanted to be the prime minister 
of the 15 million Hungarians”. The calculation included Hungarians living in neigh-













proved to be the most contentious part), and by its neighbours, which 
accepted a  series of commitments towards the Hungarian minorities 
(though without offering them autonomy).6
The treaties were fiercely contested, both in Hungary and in Slovakia 
and Romania, especially by nationalist parties, as far -right groupings 
tried to raise political capital by exploiting historically rooted resentment 
between the Hungarians and their neighbours. In Hungary, the revision-
ist idea and anti -Romanian and anti -Slovak rhetoric was exploited by the 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) led by István Csurka.7 In the 
neighbour states, nationalist groupings had emerged which sought to 
instigate fear of Hungarian revisionism and employed anti -Hungarian 
rhetoric, especially the Greater Romania Party led by Corneliu Vadim 
Tudor and the Slovak National Party of Ján Slota. The accords between 
Hungary and its neighbours were also marred by ethnically moti-
vated incidents, of which the most drastic example concerned the 1990 
Hungarian -Romanian clashes in Târgu Mureș in which five people were 
killed and around 300 were wounded.8
6 The commitments made by Romania and Slovakia towards the Hungarian minor-
ities concerned, inter alia, the right to use their native language in contacts with 
the state administration. The  treaties also included a  declaration that the two 
states would not seek to assimilate members of ethnic minorities against their will. 
It was agreed that the two states’ policies towards the minorities would be based 
on recommendations of international organisations (CSCE, UN and the Council of 
Europe). See: B. Driessen, ‘A new turn in Hungarian -Slovak relations? An overview 
of the Basic Treaty’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1997, no. 1 (4); 
B.  Nagy, ‘Hungary -Romania: Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and Good 
Neighbourliness’, International Legal Materials, March 1997, no. 2 (36).
7 Csurka was a deputy of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum to 1993 but was 
expelled from the party after a  series of antisemitic and revisionist statements. 
He  then founded his own political group, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, 
which was represented in parliament during only one term (14 deputies in the years 
1998–2002).
8 Shortly after the toppling of the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, ethnic ten-
sions surfaced in Târgu Mureș, a city with a mixed, Romanian -Hungarian popula-
tion. The Hungarians demanded broader language rights, and rumours about Hun-
garian separatists’ ambitions started circulating among the Romanian communities. 
This led to several days of unrest in which three Hungarians and two Romanians 
were killed, and several hundred people were wounded. The unrest was quelled 













On both sides of the border, however, the elites that came to power after 
the fall of Communism understood that territorial disputes needed to 
be overcome. Their choice to integrate with Western structures was 
an important factor in this. Since World War II, Western states consid-
ered the principle of inviolability of borders to be the foundation of the 
international order. Good relations with neighbours and an absence of 
territorial conflicts were also among the conditions that countries had 
to satisfy in order to join NATO and the European Union.9 Hungary 
saw accession to the European Union primarily as an opportunity for 
advancing its political and economic interests, but also as a way to miti-
gate the consequences of the Treaty of Trianon. The EU’s free move-
ment of people was regarded as an opportunity to reduce the barriers 
to contacts between Hungarians living on both sides of the border, and 
the Union’s enlargement was seen as a process that would extend dem-
ocratic standards to Central European countries, improving the status 
of the Hungarian minorities, along with the EU’s underlying principles 
of regionalism and subsidiarity.
Developing co-operation was made easier by previously established con-
tacts between the Hungarian opposition communities and Romanian or 
Czechoslovak dissidents, as well as the support expressed for their host 
countries’ democratic transition by the Hungarian minorities in the 
late 1980s. In addition to building bilateral relations, Hungary was also 
involved in developing regional co-operation – it was one of the founders 
of the Central European Initiative (formerly known as Quadragonale) 
and the Visegrad Group (formerly the Visegrad Triangle). Moreover, 
the  bloody ethnic conflict playing out just across Hungary’s border 
services in those events has not been fully explained to this day. See: M.G. Bar-
berá, ‘When Romania Flirted with a Fate like Yugoslavia’s’, Reporting Democracy, 
20 March 2020, www.balkaninsight.com; B. Ablonczy, ‘„Xenofóbiás magömlés kéjé-
ben vonagló vitézek” – 30 éve kezdődött a marosvásárhelyi fekete március’, Válasz 
Online, 16 March 2020, www.valaszonline.hu.
9 T. Ambrosio, ‘Vanquishing the Ghost of Trianon: Preventing Hungarian Irreden-
tism through Western Integration’, Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International 













in the former Yugoslavia offered a stark warning against revisionist ten-
dencies. Voices calling on Hungary to take advantage of the breakup of its 
neighbouring federal states (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union) were marginal.
After 1989, the Hungarian authorities were cautious about commemo -
rating the Treaty of Trianon. In 1990, deputies of the newly elected dem-
ocratic parliament held a minute of silence on the 70th anniversary of the 
peace accords, but at the same time called for moderation in commemo-
rating the anniversary because of the potential negative consequences 
for Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states (it was shortly after 
the ethnic unrest in Târgu Mureș). In 2000, the ruling Fidesz focused on 
celebrating the millennial anniversary of Hungarian statehood rather 
than the 80th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon.
At the same time, in the 1990s the memory of Trianon started to be cul-
tivated outside the official realm.10 A number of associations were estab-
lished which promoted, with varying intensity, the revisionist concepts 
dating back to the interwar period. Their activities included publishing 
amateur books and journals, organising events to commemorate the 
treaty, or starting initiatives to erect monuments or place commemora-
tive plaques. In many cases such organisations were created under the 
influence of emigre circles that had ‘upheld’ the revisionist traditions. 
Those groups also sought a rehabilitation of the interwar regime – par-
ticularly heated debates on the subject accompanied the repatriation of 
regent Horthy’s ashes to Hungary in 1993.
In  the early  2000s MIÉP, i.e.  the only major political party to openly 
advocate revisionist concepts, became marginalised. In spite of this, the 
deepening political and economic crisis in the second half of the decade 
10 G.  Gyáni, ‘The Memory of  Trianon as a  Political Instrument in Hungary Today’ 
[in:] A. Miller, M. Lipman (ed.), The Convolutions of Historical Politics, CEU Press, 













brought about a revival of extreme right ideologies, which became a driv-
ing force of the opposition against the liberal left government that was 
in power in 2002–2010. This movement made recourse to symbols of 
the pre -war regime and revisionist concepts. The radical party Jobbik 
became a political representation of the movement. Unlike MIÉP, Job-
bik formulated its revisionist demands in a more veiled manner, espe-
cially since it won seats in the parliament in 2010. It did not openly call 
for a revision of state borders but emphasised that they did not match the 
‘nation’s borders’ and used irredentist symbolism (such as the ‘Greater 
Hungary’ contours) in its campaigning materials. Nonetheless, the par-
ty’s main messages were focused on challenging the establishment and 
inciting anti -Roma sentiments.
The idea of Hungary’s role towards the Hungarian minorities abroad also 
evolved in the first decade of the 21st century. The discussion focused 
mainly on the issue of awarding citizenship to Hungarians living abroad.11 
In 2001, the first Orbán government introduced the so-called Status Law, 
which granted ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries vari-
ous privileges. In 2004, a referendum on the ability to apply a simplified 
procedure to awarding Hungarian citizenship to persons living outside 
the country was held. The left -liberal government of the day campaigned 
for a ‘no’ vote or abstention, invoking economic arguments and warning 
of the potential pressure that Hungarians from abroad would exert on 
the domestic labour market. The turnout was low and the referendum 
was ultimately invalid, which the Hungarian minorities saw as an affront 
on the part of the state and which prompted the right to rally around the 
issue of citizenship for Hungarians abroad. Fidesz and Jobbik strongly 
criticised the government on this, accusing it of abandoning compatriots 
abroad and thus betraying the national idea.
11 The Hungarian debates were part of a wider context of changing perceptions of 
citizenship globally in recent decades and the growing acceptance in democratic 
countries for the right of citizens to hold more than one citizenship. See: S. Pogonyi, 













In the same period, some people started to raise the point that EU mem-
bership did not solve all the problems related to the status of Hungarian 
minorities in neighbour countries. While a lot of the obstacles impeding 
cross -border contacts between Hungarians disappeared in the European 
Union (particularly in the case of Hungary and Slovakia after the two 
states joined the Schengen area in  2007), some actions by the neigh-
bouring countries, which were seen in Hungary as unfavourable from 
the point of view of the ability of Hungarians living abroad to maintain 
their national identity (such as the 2009 Slovak language bill), led to 













III. THE TREATY OF TRIANON IN THE ORBÁN ERA
Fidesz’s victory in the 2010 elections marked the most important break-
through since the end of the Communist era, as far as the commemora-
tion of the Treaty of Trianon and Hungary’s policy towards Hungarian 
minorities abroad are concerned. After winning a two -thirds majority 
in parliament, Viktor Orbán’s party first adopted a bill awarding citi-
zenship to Hungarians living abroad and made the anniversary of the 
Treaty of Trianon an official holiday. Those two issues were dealt with 
right at the beginning of Fidesz’s term, not only because they were im-
portant for the party and had been the subject of campaign pledges, but 
also because of the political calendar – the new parliament convened just 
before the 90th anniversary of the treaty.
The 4th of June was thus established as a Day of National Unity to com-
memorate the signature of the Treaty of Trianon in the first parliamen-
tary session after Fidesz’s victory. It has since been a state holiday (yet 
remains a working day). The bill establishing the holiday defines the 
notion of national unity (nemzeti összetartozás). The argument that all 
Hungarians belong to a single national community, whether they live 
in Hungary or abroad, had appeared before in political discourse, but 
the notion was not enshrined in law until 2010. The bill stated that “all 
Hungarians, individually and as members of communities, who live 
under the jurisdictions of other states, belonged in the Hungarian nation, 
the unity of which across state borders was a fact”.12 The ‘unity of the 
Hungarian nation’ formula was also reflected in the new constitution 
adopted by Fidesz (in force since 2012). It strengthened Hungary’s consti-
tutional obligations towards compatriots living abroad, endorsing their 
exercise of their individual and collective rights, and thus effectively 
their aspirations for autonomy too.13 The bill on the Treaty of Trianon 
12 2010. évi XLV. törvény a Nemzeti Összetartozás melletti tanúságtételről, quoted 
after: net.jogtar.hu.
13 See: M. Gniazdowski, A. Sadecki, ‘Constitution for a new Hungary – the domestic 













commemoration day and the new constitution’s preamble also con-
tained clear references to the sense of injury and injustice caused by 
the 1920 treaty. The bill refers to the treaty as the ‘peace dictate’, and the 
constitution pledges to “preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of 
our nation, torn apart in the storms of the last century”.14
The concept of ‘national unification’ has been implemented in practice 
by extending the right to Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians living 
outside the country. The Citizenship Act was amended accordingly dur-
ing the new parliament’s first session in 2010.15 It stipulates than any 
person who speaks Hungarian and can demonstrate that at least one 
of their descendants was a Hungarian national may obtain Hungarian 
citizen ship. In the years 2011–2019, one million people took advantage 
of this opportunity. While the new procedure applies to members of the 
Hungarian diaspora worldwide, most of those who have benefited from 
it came from Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. In 2011, Hungarian citizens 
living abroad were also awarded voting rights – they have obtained par-
tial active electoral rights, i.e. they may vote for party lists, but not for 
individual candidates in single -mandate constituencies (Hungary has 
a mixed, majority -proportional electoral system).
Finally, the institutional setup of state policies towards Hungarians liv-
ing abroad has also been upgraded. Since 2010, those issues have been 
in the charge of a  dedicated secretariat of state (initially within the 
Ministry of Justice and Administration, and currently within the Prime 
Minister’s Office). The post of a deputy prime minister without port-
folio in charge of Hungarian minorities has been created, and a dedi-
cated minorities committee has been established in parliament for the 
first time. Research institutions and think tanks have also been founded 
to support the government in formulating policies towards Hungarian 
minorities (Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad, 
14 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, The Hungarian Government, www.kormany.hu.














Research Institute for National Strategy). More funding has been allo-
cated to supporting Hungarian language culture and education in neigh-
bouring countries, and since 2015 the Hungarian government has been 
providing economic assistance to Hungarian minorities, especially in 
Serbia’s Vojvodina and Ukraine’s Transcarpathia. The Orbán government 
has also stepped up efforts to influence Hungarian parties in neighbour-
ing countries, by favouring some groups at the expense of others, and in 
some cases also mediating between different formations.
The concept of ‘national unity across state borders’, and the related new 
formula of policies towards Hungarian minorities abroad and the com-
memoration of the Treaty of Trianon, have been part of Orbán’s larger 
political project. He has represented the victorious 2010 election as the 
beginning of a new era in the country’s history and the last step towards 
completing the political transition away from Communism, while con-
sidering his broad mandate as legitimation for implementing in-depth 
changes.16 Thus, Hungary set out to re-define attitudes towards cer-
tain historical events (including the signature of the Treaty of Trianon) 
and the ‘Hungarian -Hungarian’ relations. Those activities were also 
a response to the growing presence of the Treaty of Trianon in public 
debate and the fact that the increasingly popular Jobbik was raising the 
topic. In this way Fidesz tried to win over the more radical sections of the 
right -wing electorate. Tellingly, Jobbik was the only opposition party that 
backed the establishment of an official holiday on the treaty anniversary.
Despite this, the topic of the Treaty of Trianon has not dominated Fidesz’s 
historical policy or ideological messaging in the last decade. The cele-
brations of the Day of National Unity established by the Orbán govern-
ment have usually been held without the highest -ranking state officials. 
Public holidays commemorating the Hungarian uprisings, i.e. the anni-
versary of the  1848 People’s Spring on  15 March and the anniversary 














of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution on 23 October, have been treated as 
considerably more important and celebrated with much more grandeur. 
It was on such occasions that the massive political rallies would be organ-
ised in Budapest, culminating with the prime minister’s speech.
The reason for this was that the Treaty of Trianon, which stood for the 
greatest defeat suffered by Hungary in the 20th century, did not fully fit 
Fidesz’s main narrative. At the centre of that narrative lay the defence 
of the country’s sovereignty and interests which, according to the gov-
ernment, were constantly threatened from outside. The struggles with 
foreign criticism and the pressure from influential states and institutions 
have been represented as the greatest challenge faced by the Hungari-
ans. Hence, the political narrative resorted mainly to the examples of 
the Hungarian uprisings of 1848 and 1956, while Orbán portrayed him-
self as the continuator of the freedom tradition. Any reservations about 
the government’s reforms would be dismissed by Fidesz politicians as 
normal political disputes between the right and the left, while the left 
was castigated for having originated from the Communist dictatorship. 
Since 2015, the government’s main narrative has been built around the 
trope of defending the country against immigrants. The political narra-
tives now more often invoked Hungary’s Christian heritage and the myth 
of Europe’s defence against foreigners.
In  this context, references to the Treaty of Trianon served mainly to 
illustrate the contrast between the state’s collapse in that era and its 
current reconstruction and growing power, and the fact that Hungary 
had survived that catastrophe was represented as testament to the Hun-
garian nation’s vitality. In some cases, the treaty has also been invoked 
as illustrative of an aversion to Hungary on the part of Western elites.17 
17 This kind of narrative can be found in numerous speeches by Orbán and in state-
ments by Mária Schmidt, the head of the House of Terror museum in Budapest and 
the main ideologue in charge of Fidesz’s historical policy. See, e.g.: Speech by Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán on the Hungarian Day of National Cohesion, Hungarian 













The Orbán government has been more likely than its predecessors to 
refer back to the interwar decades, and especially the early years, i.e. the 
so-called consolidation period under prime minister István  Bethlen 
(1921–1931). That era evoked images of the country’s reconstruction after 
a crisis and of a strong and stable government, which were useful in 
legitimating prime minister Orbán and his policies and governance 
practices.
The caution in raising the topics of the Treaty of Trianon or Horthy’s 
rule has also been motivated by the way those issues are perceived in 
the neighbouring states. Contemporary references to the interwar revi-
sionism lead to suspicions that today’s Hungary might seek to revise 
the borders with its neighbours. Budapest’s involvement in supporting 
autonomist movements or the Orbán government’s growing influence 
on the political parties of the Hungarian minorities are also often seen 
as threats to the territorial integrity of Hungary’s neighbours.
The  establishment of an  official holiday to commemorate the Treaty 
of Trianon in 2010 and the new citizenship rules have come in for the 
fiercest criticism in Slovakia. The strength of the reaction was to a large 
extent due to the ongoing election campaign and the presence of the 
Slovak National Party in the government coalition. Slovakia was the 
only one among Hungary’s neighbours to respond to the new citizen-
ship law by prohibiting Slovak nationals from holding dual citizenship.18 
The Hungarian Foreign Ministry, however, dismissed the allegations of 
territorial revisionism and the claims that it supported the separatist 
aspirations of Hungarian minorities.19
18 A  similar prohibition is laid down in the constitution of Ukraine, but it is not 
enforced and it is quite common for people to hold dual citizenship (not only Hun-
garian). Since 2019, discussions have been going on in Ukraine about changing the 
rules and allowing dual citizenship.
19 For example, the then foreign minister János Martonyi, in an interview for Frank-













While Hungarian governments since 1990 have supported the interests 
of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries and defended their 
rights, the Orbán government has been particularly assertive about it. 
In many cases it even resorted to blackmail, e.g. by making Hungary’s 
support for its neighbours’ integration with the EU or NATO conditional 
on reforms to their minority policies, even though Budapest regards the 
membership of its neighbours in those organisations as beneficial for the 
interests of both Hungary and the Hungarian minorities. It also acted 
similarly in the case of the dispute over Serbia’s restitution law and the 
education bill in Ukraine.20 Over the last decade, however, its relations 
with Slovakia and Serbia have improved considerably, and Belgrade’s 
policies are now seen by the Orbán government a model for treating 
national minorities.
On the other hand, relations with Romania and Ukraine deteriorated 
considerably in the second half of the decade. Both countries are par‑
ticularly sensitive to any revisionist allusions on the part of Hungary, 
also because during Fidesz’s time in power, Hungary has experienced 
a gradual rapprochement with Russia – the contester ‑in ‑chief of Europe’s 
existing political order. Kyiv’s distrust of Budapest deepened after Vik‑
tor Orbán called for autonomy for the Hungarians in Carpathian Ruthe‑
nia in May 2014, at a  time when Ukraine was struggling to deal with 
Russian aggression (the Hungarian authorities nonetheless expressed 
support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine).21 Kyiv and Bucharest 
are also concerned about the Fidesz government’s rhetoric concerning 
the crisis of the West and the decline of the existing global order. What 
Hungarian politicians have in mind is primarily a shift in the economic 
balance of power and the crisis of liberal democracy, yet this rhetoric 
20 See: A. Sadecki, M. Szpala, ‘The Serbian‑Hungarian dispute over the restitution 
law’, OSW, 19 October 2011, www.osw.waw.pl; T.  Iwański, A.  Sadecki, ‘Ukraine–
Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights’, OSW 
Commentary, no. 280, 14 August 2018, www.osw.waw.pl.














raises suspicions that Hungary might question the region’s geopolitical 
order and, consequently, the existing state borders.
In recent years Romania and Ukraine have taken measures against the 
Hungarian extreme right, which has numerous direct links to Moscow 
and has stepped up its revisionist rhetoric after Russia annexed the 
Ukrainian territory of Crimea (for instance, several Jobbik politicians 
served as observers during the illegal referendum in Crimea). Since 2014, 
Ukraine has banned a number of Jobbik activists from entering its terri-
tory, including Jobbik’s former treasurer who has been accused of espi-
onage for Russia. Romania, on the other hand, in 2014 refused entry to 
the then Jobbik chair and took measures to impede the activities of other 
party members within its territory.
While the Orbán government often exploits symbolic disputes with 
neighbours for domestic political gain, it has also sought agreement 
with the governments of neighbouring countries which are important 
for Hungary’s foreign policy. The importance of economic co-operation 
with its neighbours has increased considerably in recent years. Slovakia 
and Romania are two of Hungary’s top -five trading partners, and Slova-
kia is Hungary’s second most important export market after Germany, 
and transport routes and energy links crucial for Hungary are located 
in its neighbours’ territories. In view of the tensions between Budapest 
and most Western states, regional co-operation, especially within the 
Visegrad Group, has become even more important as an instrument for 
pursuing Hungary’s interests in the European Union. This co-operation 
became particularly close during the migration crisis when the V4 coun-
tries presented a  joint position on the EU migration quotas and, for 
instance, Slovakian police were involved in patrolling Hungary’s south-
ern borders. Prime minister Orbán’s ambition was to lead the region’s 
migration policies and to build a counterbalance to the Western part of 















The subject of the Treaty of Trianon became particularly pronounced 
in Hungary’s public debate in the run-up to the centenary of its signa-
ture. Initial discussions on the topic had already been held on the occa-
sion of the World War I centenary in 2014, but the debate became really 
heated four years later, when Hungary’s neighbours were celebrating the 
centenaries of their independence or national reunification. Hungary 
did not celebrate the end of World War I, which from its point of view 
stood for defeat and disintegration. It is worth noting here that Hunga-
ry’s perceptions of the political order that emerged after World War I are 
critical not so much of the idea of self -determination of nations as such, 
which was crucial in shaping that order, as its inconsistent application 
to the process of setting Hungary’s new borders. This is why Budapest 
reacted positively to the independence centenary celebrations in Poland, 
with which Hungary traditionally maintains close relations, but the 
Romanian celebrations of reunification with Transylvania in Decem-
ber 2018 were seen as controversial in Hungary.22
A number of factors have influenced the Fidesz government’s approach 
to commemorating the Treaty of Trianon centenary. The government 
wanted to take advantage of the public sentiments that the treaty still 
evokes. As noted before, most Hungarians consider the treaty to have 
been the country’s greatest national tragedy, but that does not mean that 
revisionist attitudes are dominant: for instance, more than half of sur-
veyed respondents argue that there is no longer any point in discuss-
ing this issue today (see Appendix: The memory of the Treaty of Trianon 
in public opinion surveys). However, the subject remains very important 
for groups with nationalist views, i.e.  the electorate for which Fidesz 
vies with the far -right parties. The final outline of the commemorations 
is also a result of various tendencies within Fidesz itself, where radical 
22 In 2016 the Foreign Minister, Péter Szijjártó, prohibited Hungarian diplomats from 














voices clash with more pragmatic ones,23 and of current foreign policy 
calculations.
The Orbán government’s approach to the Treaty of Trianon centenary 
largely reflects the policies his cabinet has pursued hitherto, in which 
national unity across state borders has been a central idea. Fidesz twice 
rejected the opposition Jobbik’s proposal to make 2020 the Year of the 
Treaty of Trianon Commemoration. Instead, in June 2019 the parliament 
announced that 2020 would be the Year of National Unity (even so, the 
respective bill’s justification emphasised that the aim was to commemo-
rate the centenary of the Trianon ‘peace dictate’, as right -wing politicians 
commonly call the treaty). Apart from Fidesz, the bill was backed by most 
opposition deputies, with only five deputies of the left -wing Democratic 
Coalition voting against.
The unveiling of the Treaty of Trianon monument funded on this occa-
sion by the authorities was intended to be the main event of the cente-
nary celebrations. In keeping with the official narrative, it is named the 
Monument of National Unity. Located in a street across the parliament 
building, it consists of a 100 metre long ramp which descends four metres 
below street level. Engraved on its walls are the Hungarian names of all 
the cities, towns and localities that belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary 
in 1913 (including those that were part of the then autonomous Croatia). 
At the end of the ramp, there is a cracked granite block with an ‘inter-
nal flame’ inside.24 By choosing this design, the Hungarian government 
avoided those symbols directly associated with interwar revisionism, 
such as the ‘Greater Hungary’ contour or the ‘Trianon’ inscription on 
a cross. On the other hand, by engraving the names of places now situ-
ated in neighbouring countries, it did not so much emphasise the nation’s 
23 For instance, the parliament speaker, László Kövér, who has often expressed the 
most radical views on the subject, ordered the Szekler flag – which symbolises sup-
port for Hungarian autonomy in Transylvania – to be flown from the parliament 
building instead of the EU flag.














unity across borders as directly point to the geographic dimension of 
the national community.
A number of smaller, local commemorative events have also been planned 
for the centenary, financially supported by the government to the tune 
of HUF 10 billion (around EUR 30 million).25 The greatest portion of the 
money (around a third) went to the foundation led by Mária Schmidt. 
Another HUF 1.1 billion was allocated to Hungarian minority organisa-
tions in neighbouring countries. However, as the decision to award this 
funding was not taken until late February, shortly before the COVID-19 
pandemic spread to Hungary, it is unclear if the organisations in ques-
tion will be able to carry out the projects they had planned.
The tone of the celebrations was set by Viktor Orbán in several speeches 
in late 2019 and the early months of the centenary year. The prime min-
ister referred to the Treaty of Trianon as a historical tragedy, which he 
dubbed a  ‘death sentence’ meted out to the Hungarian nation. At  the 
same time, he emphasised that the nation still managed to survive 
for a century. Orbán noted that Hungary today was not only a strong 
nation but – unlike in the period that immediately followed the Treaty 
of Trianon – it was surrounded by states with which it forms a strong 
Central European alliance. He also called on people to celebrate the cen-
tenary reasonably.26
At the same time, the ruling camp has made a number of direct gestures 
to the nationalist electorate, such as references to the symbols of pre -war 
revisionism and the admission of radical views to the pro -government 
press. The  first signs of this attitude became visible even before the 
centenary. For instance, on the 98th anniversary of the treaty the pro-
-government daily Magyar Idők published an  interview with a  leading 
25 Ordinance of the Government of Hungary no. 1064/2020, 28.02.2020, quoted after: 
www.magyarkozlony.hu.














advocate of revisionist ideas who called for an adjustment of borders 
and suggested that Hungary should seek the assistance of one of the 
world’s leading powers to that end.27 The pro -government tabloid portal 
Pesti Srácok wrote that Hungary would never accept the loss of its “one-
-thousand -years -old family jewels”.28 Moreover, in June 2018 a rock opera 
about the Treaty of Trianon was staged in Heroes’ Square in Budapest, 
which contained a series of revisionist allusions and was subsequently 
aired several times by public television.29
Materials posted by members of the Orbán government in social media 
have often featured maps of the Kingdom of Hungary with the pre-
-Trianon borders, i.e. one of the principal elements of the interwar revi-
sionist iconography.30 The prime minister himself spoke in front of such 
a map during a meeting of the party leadership in December 2019, and on 
the occasion of the school -leaving history exams in May 2020, he posted 
a picture of a globe from his cabinet, with ‘Greater Hungary’ in a cen-
tral position on his Facebook account.31 In his annual February address, 
which sums up the previous year and sets out the government’s goals for 
the current year, Orbán made a reference to a well -known irredentist 
prayer dating back to the interwar period (‘For the resurrection of Hun-
gary’).32 Finally, the school curriculum modified in January 2020 now 
features a stronger presence of nationalist authors and topics associated 
with the revisionist idea.33
27 ‘Raffay Ernő: Erdély nincs elveszve’, Magyar Idők, 4 June 2018, www.magyaridok.hu.
28 T.  Pilhál, ‘Üzenet Erdély terrorista elcsatolóinak: a  gyulafehérvári módszer for-
dítva is működni fog!’, PestiSrácok.hu, 1 December 2019, www.pestisracok.hu.
29 ‘A tévében is bemutatják a Trianon-rockoperát hétvégén’, Origo, 28 November 2018, 
www.origo.hu.
30 See, for instance, the film on the facebook of Árpád Potápy  – deputy and secre-
tary of state for national policy at the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, 15 April 2020, 
www.facebook.com.
31 Fidesz leadership meeting with PM Orbán, 16 December 2019, www.facebook.com; 
PM Orbán’s facebook post on the occasion of the school-leaving history exams, 
6 May 2020, www.facebook.com.
32 See: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s “State of the Nation” address, Hungarian Gov-
ernment, 16 February 2020, www.kormany.hu.














Such moves have attracted criticism from Hungary’s neighbours. As re-
gards the relations between Hungary and Romania, the two countries 
have been trading gestures to rekindle historical disputes – in May 2020 
the Romanian parliament passed a law establishing a Treaty of Trianon 
Commemoration Day on the 4th of June, even though reunification with 
Transylvania is already commemorated on Great Union Day on the 
1st of December. Interestingly, in recent months the leaders of Croatia and 
Slovenia, i.e. states with which Hungary had no open historical disputes, 
also expressed criticism of Budapest’s use of the ‘Greater Hungary’ map. 
Nevertheless, the first months of the centenary year have brought about 
no major discords between the neighbours. On the one hand, Hungary’s 
neighbours seem to show some understanding of Hungary’s commem-
oration of the Trianon centenary and react only to openly revisionist 
rhetoric, but on the other hand the government in Budapest has been 
constantly emphasising its commitment to co-operation with Central 
European states.
The most radical messages on the treaty’s centenary have been formu-
lated by revisionist organisations, which have stepped up their activities 
in connection with the anniversary. One of the most widely commented 
actions taken on this occasion consisted of the collection of signatures 
under a petition to ‘invalidate the Treaty of Trianon’, but this has con-
stituted no more than a symbolic act without any legal significance.34 
Whereas Jobbik has been gradually abandoning its most radical postu-
lates and shifting towards the centre -right in the years 2018–2020, the 
Our Homeland party (Mi Hazánk) has become the leading voice for revi-
sionist ideas. Formed in 2018, mainly by a group of breakaway members 
from Jobbik, the party has brought together extreme right organisations 
and activists and has been increasingly vocal about the question of the 
Treaty of Trianon. In January 2020, in connection with the centenary, 
it announced a  seven -point plan in which the main demand was for 
34 According to the organisers, as of February the petition had been signed by some 














the Hungarian parliament to annul the Treaty of Trianon ratification 
(Act XXXIII of 1921).35 Our Homeland has also called for restoration of 
the monument to the Hungarian irredentism in the Freedom Square in 
Budapest, whose place is now occupied by a monument to Soviet soldiers.
Recent years have seen an evolution of the attitudes of liberal and left 
parties towards the treaty and the Hungarian minorities in neighbour 
states. On the one hand, they have been criticising Fidesz for resorting 
to nationalist slogans and exploiting the public sentiments associated 
with the treaty, but on the other hand they have started to commemorate 
the treaty’s signature in their own way, backed the amendments to the 
Citizenship Act in 2010, and in 2019 overwhelmingly voted for the treaty 
centenary to be celebrated as the Year of National Unity.















Since 2010, the Fidesz government has strengthened its policies towards 
the Hungarian minorities, embedded the notion of national unity across 
state borders in legislation and been more active than its predecessors 
in commemorating the Treaty of Trianon. However, it has not funda-
mentally departed from the basic principles defined in 1990 by Hunga-
ry’s first democratic government, which combine support for Hungarian 
minorities abroad with efforts to maintain good relations with its neigh-
bours. In recent years, those relations have been particularly important 
because regional co-operation has been the government’s priority  – 
as one of the pillars of the Fidesz government’s foreign policy and Viktor 
Orbán’s ideological concepts.
While the sense of grievance and injustice associated with the Treaty 
of  Trianon is deeply rooted in the Hungarian national identity, the 
revisionist idea does not hold much potential for political mobilisation. 
Although a number of political parties exploit public sentiments associ-
ated with the memory of Hungary’s post -war disintegration, none of the 
mainstream parties directly call for a revision of state borders. The polit-
ical elites seem to understand that as a country with an open, export-
-oriented economy, Hungary is a beneficiary of the existing political and 
economic order in Europe. The 20th century attempts at altering borders, 
and their bloody consequences, remain a warning that shapes current 
thinking about the Treaty of Trianon.
The Orbán government’s use of revisionist symbolism, which has inten-
sified during the centenary year, may nonetheless create unrealistic 
expectations among the public and cause difficulties in relations with its 
neighbours. This refers in particular to neighbouring countries which are 
struggling against foreign aggression, such as Ukraine, as well as Roma-
nia and Slovakia, where the memory of Hungary’s revisionism of the 













groups. The resulting tensions may destabilise regional co-operation and 















Causes of the disintegration of the Kingdom of Hungary
 • As part of the Austria -Hungary Dual Monarchy, the  Kingdom 
of Hungary was among those defeated in World War I. The Hun-
garian leadership had been reluctant to go to war, but it ac-
cepted the decision of the government in Vienna as foreign 
and military affairs were within its remit. The Trianon peace 
accord of June 1920 was one of a series of treaties signed in the 
Paris area between the victorious Allies and the defeated Cen-
tral Powers or their successor states (Germany, Austria, Bulgaria 
and Turkey).
 • The  Kingdom of Hungary had been a multinational state in 
which ethnic Hungarians accounted for around half of the 
population (45% in the 1880 census and 54% in the 1910  census). 
The  19th  century saw a  rise of the political aspirations of na-
tional minorities, towards whom Budapest pursued a  policy 
of assimilation. As the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated, the 
Slovak political elites chose to join the newly founded state of 
Czecho slovakia, the Romanians from Transylvania opted for 
unification with the Kingdom of Romania, and the Vojvodina 
Serbs decided to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo-
venes (the  future Yugoslavia). In the years 1918–1919 those three 
states took over the territories inhabited by the respective eth-
nic groups, which was then sealed by the Treaty of Trianon. 
 However, some 3.2 million Hungarians also found themselves 
outside Hungary.
 • Hungary’s neighbours could count on favourable treatment 
from the great powers during the Paris peace conference. France 













in Central and Eastern Europe as a  counterbalance to both 
Germany and communist Russia. For this reason, territorial 
disputes were usually decided in favour of the allies, and stra-
tegic considerations often overrode ethnic criteria. Hungary’s 
request to hold plebiscites in areas with mixed populations was 
also rejected (with the exception of the city of Sopron, which 
consequently found itself in Hungary).
 • Hungary’s political instability in the first years of independ-
ence also contributed to the loss of some territories. In the years 
1918–1920 Hungary went through several coups: the abolition of 
monarchy and establishment of a democratic republic, which 
the Bolsheviks then took over and established a  Hungarian 
Soviet Republic, and the restitution of monarchy with regent 
Miklós Horthy at the helm. Each of these governments tried 
to stop the disintegration of Hungary but neither the belated 
attempt to award autonomy to the minorities, nor the efforts 
toobtain communist Russia’s support or the various military and 
diplomatic endeavours prevented the loss of most of the King-
dom of Hungary’s pre -war territory.
Based on: I.  Romsics, The  Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The  Peace Treaty of 














The memory of the Treaty of Trianon  
in public opinion surveys36
According to a  public opinion survey conducted in early  2020, 
83% of Hungarians consider the Treaty of Trianon to have been the 
greatest tragedy in their country’s history. However, views on how 
that accord from one hundred years ago should be treated today are 
much more varied. The opinion that the decisions taken in Trianon 
should never be accepted is shared by 54% of respondents (41% are 
of the opposite opinion). At the same time, however, 51% of respon-
dents believe that this issue is no longer relevant today (46% think 
otherwise). If political preferences are taken into account, the sup-
porters of right -wing parties (Fidesz and Jobbik) are much more 
likely to find the Trianon issue important and requiring action 
than those who support the liberal and left parties (the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, the Democratic Coalition and Momentum). Many 
Hungarians are also aware that the topic is being exploited for 
 political ends. 59% of respondents agree with the statement that 
‘the question of the Treaty of Trianon recurs so often solely for 
political reasons because it is useful in arousing national emotions’ 
(while 36% disagree). This view is shared by a great majority of 
supporters of all opposition parties, including Jobbik.
36 Survey by Publicus Research for the Népszava daily conducted in February 2020 


















Hungary before World War I37 282 18.2
Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon 93 7.9
Source: I. Romsics, The Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920, 
New York 2002.
Table 2. Areas and populations incorporated into neighbouring states 
under the Treaty of Trianon





Romania 103 5 / 1.6
Czechoslovakia 61 3.5 / 1




Source: I. Romsics, The Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920, 
New York 2002.
37 Excluding Croatia, which enjoyed broad autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary 
since 1868.
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Map 1. The Kingdom of Hungary before World War I and after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon












Kingdom of Hungary border before World War I
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Map 2. Areas in Central Europe with Hungarian majorities
Source: censuses of 2001 (Ukraine) and 2011 (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia).
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